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*  
 Introduction 
 
In what follows, I put forward an argument for an analytical method 
for social science that operates at the level of genre. I argue that generic 
convergence, generic hybridity, and generic instability provide us with a 
powerful perspectives on changes in political, cultural, and economic 
relationships, most specifically at the level of institutions. Such a 
perspective can help us identify the transitional elements, relationships, 
and trajectories that define the place of our current system in history, 
thereby grounding our understanding of possible futures.1 In historically 
contextualising our present with this method, my concern is to indicate 
possibilities for the future. Systemic contradictions indicate possibility 
spaces within which systemic change must and will emerge. We live in a 
system currently dominated by many fully-expressed contradictions, and 
so in the presence of many possible futures.  
The contradictions of the current age are expressed most overtly in 
the public genres of power politics. Contemporary public policy—indeed 
politics in general-is an excellent focus for any investigation of possible 
futures, precisely because of its future-oriented function. It is overtly 
hortatory; it is designed ‘to get people to do things’ (Muntigl in press: 
147). There is no point in trying to get people to do things in the past. 
Consequently, policy discourse is inherently oriented towards creating 
some future state of affairs (Graham in press), along with concomitant 
ways of being, knowing, representing, and acting (Fairclough 2000).  
There are, therefore, complications with the temporality of political 
discourse. Its tense system is a very complex spiral, as it is with social 
time in general; there is no simple past, present, or future. The discourse 
firstly seems to be in the future-in-present tense, referring to irrealis (or 
potential) states of affairs, as if they already existed (Graham in press). To 
further complicate the analysis of policy, it is ostensibly based on 
empirical imperatives; namely, on what is “known” about the world, past 
and present. Political discourse thus tends to transform and translate the 
“isness” of “expert” knowledge about the world into the “oughtness” of 
imperatives for future actions, thus operationalising various and ongoing 
forms of the naturalistic fallacy (Graham and Rooney in press). The 
paradox of the future-in-presentness of political texts is that they are 
historically and institutionally situated productions of a very particular 
kind; their generic and functional ontology, their primary tense is past-in-
present-they draw heavily upon the past for their authority in the here-
and-now. This latter temporal aspect is the primary focus of my analytical 
approach. 
Mediation, functional convergence, and genre hybridity: some definitions  
Political discourse sometimes grasps the character of its socio-
historical situatedness. More often it does not. Whichever is the case at 
present, we can at least be sure that particular discourses only become 
possible at particular times in history. The character of contemporary 
western societies’ public discourse is unlikely to rate as being of historical 
 significance, other than to demonstrate once again that extending the mass, 
speed, and space of our mediations encourages hyperbolic speculation 
about the future and nature of being human (Graham 2000). A more 
interesting focus is the hidden convergences from within which 
contemporary public discourses emerge; within which they are framed; 
and within which they are articulated.  
Much has been said about the changing nature of the political 
process in the west, including the alleged “transcendence” (or 
disappearance) of the left-right divide in the “Third Way”, and the 
“marketisation” of politics (cf.  Fairclough 2000; Graham 2000; Postman 
1985, 1993; Saul 1992, 1997; McKenna & Graham 2000). While such 
changes may be seen as epiphenomenal, they can also be seen as 
constitutive and constituted at deeper levels, and thus provide a useful 
point of departure for understanding the broader changes that are 
happening. To highlight some of the more paradoxical effects of the 
current era, I focus our investigation of contemporary political relations at 
the level of genre, “above” the level of political texts, and “below” the 
level of political discourses. The differences between these levels or units 
of analysis are best seen in terms of systemic stability and metastability 
(Lemke 1995: chapt. 6), or, in terms of duration. 
I define discourses as representations of the world according to the 
‘thematic patterns’ (Lemke 1995: 42) peculiar to the historically 
constituted worldviews of particular communities. Discourses remain 
relatively stable over longer periods of time than do genres, whereas the 
textual constituencies of genres (the organisation of which make genres 
recognisable as such) are far more ephemeral than genres. Genres, in 
other words, are necessarily more enduring than the texts that constitute 
them, while (what I am calling) discourses are more enduring than the 
genres they are expressed through. Rather than reifying these categories 
(discourse, genres and texts), I want to emphasise that I am putting 
forward interdependent, relational conceptions of these categories for 
understanding human meaning-making. Also, it should be noted that 
people inhabit many discourse communities (work, family, ethno-
linguistic and religious groups, and so on), all of which differ in terms of 
influence and durability; none of which can be seen as a free-standing 
edifice—each is significant only in relation to others, and forms part of an 
‘empty set’ of  ‘specification hierarchies’, categories designed for 
analytical convenience (Lemke 1995: 104-106). 
I can exemplify categorical differences in terms of relational 
stability and metastability by taking the front page of a newspaper as one 
example of what I mean by a genre (or generic form of expression, or 
rhetorical mode). Each day, over relatively long periods of time, 
newspaper front pages have remained recognisably “the same”. The 
contents of the page, the texts (including images) that “fill” the space of 
the genre, change on a daily basis. The discourses that are articulated 
through the texts and genres of newspaper front pages, though, can be 
reproduced on for centuries at a time, not only on the front page of a 
newspaper, but throughout whole societies. But newspaper front pages do 
 change—sometimes imperceptibly, at other times, with much pomp and 
ceremony, such as, for instance, when newspapers begin to use colour 
photographs on their front pages (cf. Kress and van Leeuwen 1998).  
Generic forms are not only peculiar to overtly mediated 
phenomena; once again, from a relational perspective, genres can also be 
seen as ‘operationalised discourses and styles’, as ‘ways of acting’, or 
‘ways of being’ (cf. Fairclough 2000). In historical terms, we need only 
look back a few decades to see the historically persistent discourse of 
“heroic leadership” expressed in the generic forms of Mussolini, Hitler, 
Franco, Mao, Hirohito, Tito, and Stalin, for instance: army uniforms, 
visions of the future, populist liberation rhetoric—heroic nationalist texts, 
all of them. Like the newspaper front page, the generic, embodied 
expression of the “heroic leadership” discourse has changed slowly but 
surely.  
Today the military medal has given way to the MBA. Today’s 
generic leader is an ostensibly risk-oriented, financially fluent 
businessman, an embodiment of the dominant discourse of the day. He 
will usually wear an Italian suit or chambre shirt and jeans, depending on 
the gravity of the occasion. He will appear to be unerringly energetic and 
resolute. He will be (ideally) in his mid- to late-forties, with photogenic, 
“rugged” good looks, a glib sense of sound-bite humour. He will have no 
hesitation in operationalising whichever discourse, of whichever 
orientation, in response to public temperament, as expressed in the latest 
opinion polls (another invention of the 1930s). Most of all he will be both 
visionary, practical, and efficient; idealistic, but “not afraid to make the 
tough decisions” that today’s demanding world requires. And so on. 
Generic forms – genres – solicit and elicit expectations. That is their 
functional efficiency. That very efficiency is also the product of specific 
institutions of power (Graham and Hearn 2000).  
For the purposes of this paper, day-to-day texts are fairly much 
irrelevant, if only because they are constitutive of (and constituted by) 
phenomena that are quite literally as old as history (Graham 2000). My 
focus here is on the hybridisation of genres by means of institutional 
(functional) convergences and antagonisms. Genre provides a useful level 
of analysis for identifying and discussing institutional change, and thus 
for speculating upon the contradictions and possibilities that such changes 
express and inevitably prefigure. In the following sections, I compare the 
method I am presenting here with layered methodologies and show, 
through the analyses of genre hybridity, the usefulness of this perspective 
for doing historically contextualised research into possible futures. What I 
foreground in the analyses is the mutual impacts of mediation and generic 
convergence; the relationship between the infusion of the everyday 
through all-pervasive media and the concomitant conflation of 
institutionally functional genres.  
Another layered approach?  
Whilst I eschew any categorisation of “post”ness for the method I 
am proposing and demonstrating here (if only because of my basic 
assumption about the helical nature of social time), it has clear resonances 
 with Inayatullah’s (1998, in press) Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) 
approach. CLA sees reality happening at the ‘the litany – the most visible’; 
the ‘social, economic and technological’; the ‘worldview/discourse’; and 
the ‘myth/metaphor’ levels (Inayatullah in press). These levels correspond, 
in some degree, to categories in critical, systemic-functionally oriented 
linguistics (specifically, Critical Discourse Analysis, or CDA), from 
which I derive most aspects of the method presented here (see, eg, 
Fairclough 1989 1992 2000; Halliday 1993 1994; Lemke 1995 1998 2000; 
Martin 1998 1999 2000). The critical systemic-functional “school” (it is a 
far from homogeneous movement in any respect) has its roots in Marxian 
influenced social anthropology (cf. esp. Bloch 1977; Firth 1953 1954; 
Malinowski 1921), although this is either not often made explicit, or is 
otherwise completely forgotten. While I have no time to explicate 
anything like a comprehensive comparison of the methods, or of the 
multi- and trans-disciplinary similarities and differences embedded in 
CDA and CLA, I will briefly examine how each perspective might most 
overtly and broadly inform, enhance or modify the other.  
Both methods are intrinsically historical, and assume that what is 
said or written or represented is a significant, though epiphenomenal, 
entry point for understanding social realities. This epiphenomenal level is 
the ‘litany’ in CLA and (to artificially separate both terms from the rest of 
their respective systems to some degree) the ‘presentational’ in Lemke’s 
(1995: 42) approach to CDA. It is the most overt level of meaning-making, 
and often the most contentious where ‘textual politics’ are at issues (cf. 
Inayatullah in press; Lemke 1995). What Inayatullah calls ‘reality’ is 
understood from my own CDA perspective as ‘meaning’. CDA tends 
towards more detailed analyses of meaning-making events, and provides 
some useful tools for doing so. CLA, on the other hand, is more clearly 
grounded in macro-historical traditions (Galtung 1997), an aspect often 
missing (at least in explicit terms) from many CDA analyses (there are 
exceptions). My own variant of CDA derives from work in systems theory, 
and a political economy of communication heavily influenced by Marx’s 
writing, though not what is generally called “Marxism” (Graham 1999 
2000 in press; Graham and McKenna 2000; McKenna and Graham 2000). 
I thus tend to emphasise what Maurice Bloch (1977) calls The Past And 
The Present In The Present, and what Gebser calls (1949/1985) The Ever-
Present Origin, when analysing the social production processes of 
meaning, thus standing somewhere “in between” the detailed (sometimes 
micro-grammatical) analyses of texts in CDA, and the more macro-
historical orientation of CLA.  
Differences in the methods are most overt where notions of 
‘metaphor’ and myth are concerned. In CLA metaphor is the ‘deepest’ 
and ‘least visible’ level of analysis (Inayatullah in press). From a CDA 
perspective, metaphor is analysable at all levels of meaning-making 
(though it is considered to be no more ‘visible’ than in CLA): the 
‘contextual metaphor’ peculiar to the level of genre (Martin, 2000); 
‘grammatical metaphor’, which can be seen to happen at the 
‘presentational’ level of meaning-making (how things are expressed 
 within a particular representational event), ‘displacement metaphors’ 
(Graham and Rooney in press) most identifiable in the ‘attitudinal’ aspect 
of meaning (the evaluative or orientational aspects of discourse), and the 
‘ideational’ metaphors peculiar to the ‘organisational’ (the forces and 
relations that provide coherence for the text, including culturally 
embedded mythical forms) level of meaning (cf. Graham in press, 
forthcoming; Lemke 1995, 1998; Martin 1998, 1999, 2000; Thibault in 
press). Myth is, for the most part, seen as being “outside” the realms of 
analysis in CDA, although my own approach treats this level as 
‘sedimentary’, or, as an historically constitutive and ever-present 
“residue” of oral culture (Graham 2000, in press, forthcoming). 
Both methods can clearly analyse ways of meaning ‘typologically’, 
as taxonomically characterised ways of meaning, and ‘topologically’, as 
continuously variable possibility spaces within which certain meanings 
can be expressed (cf. Lemke 1995; Martin, 2000). Both are theories of 
knowing, relating, representing, and creating social realities. Most 
importantly, and this is where the methods are most similar, both see 
‘meaning’, ‘representing’, or social ‘reality’ as something that is done, as 
historical work, in which the “work” of history is often rendered invisible 
at many levels at once. Both see language (or more broadly and actively, 
representing) as a multi-faceted reality that can be seen to be 
interdependently happening at many levels, with multiple and complex 
causal relatedness. As such, an underpinning assumption of both CLA and 
CDA is that acts of representing ‘cannot be understood outside of their 
historical contexts; but neither can they be derived from these contexts by 
any simple relation’; they are ‘at the same time a part of reality, a shaper 
of reality, and a metaphor for reality’ (Halliday 1993: 8).  
In that sense, and many others, what I am putting forward here can 
unquestionably be characterised as a form of layered analysis. While 
much more could be said on the various limitations, associations, 
divergences and complementarities of the two approaches for grasping the 
human condition, that is not my primary purpose here and so it will have 
to wait for another day. In what follows, I exemplify the salience of what 
is, essentially, the foundations for a new method of analysis, whether seen 
as a form of layered analysis or as CDA. I begin with the primary tense of 
what Marx and Engels call ‘the language of real life’ ([1844] 1972: 118), 
the past-in-present.  
Seeing the past-in-present  
The first move in analysing the present is to “expose” the most 
overt elements of the past-in-present tense within “globalised” humanity. 
The most broadly defining features of the contemporary global condition 
are delineated by the extremes of war and trade. These oldest of 
intersocietal relations exemplify excessive and (apparently)  opposed 
aspects of the human condition. In the current globalised system, we have 
these antithetical but complementary discourses being doubly 
rearticulated in the monologic discourses of hyper-rational managerialism 
(Armitage and Graham 2001). As a part of this process, politics (perhaps 
naturally) has become infused with the perverse, totalitarian discourses of 
 hyper-rational managerialism. Simultaneously, political discourse has 
become part of the macro-genre of “entertainment”, part of a massified 
industry owned by as few as six men which now spans the globe (Wolf 
1999). Generic convergences in the policy process, combined with the 
“entertainmentisation” of politics, have had the effect of turning policy 
into a hybridised commodity, as well as commodifying and fetishising 
policy producers and the policy production process itself (Fairclough 
2000). In turn, this has added impetus to the systemic tendency of capital 
towards commodification of human experience in general (Graham 2000).  
Today, few if any aspects of human activity are now beyond the 
technical, conceptual, or legislative grasp of formal commodification. 
This appears to be a characteristic of capital. As it progresses as a system 
of social organisation, increasingly intimate aspects of human experience 
are subsumed under its formal processes. The very idea of a “knowledge 
economy” exemplifies the trend (Graham 2000). At the same time, 
economic decision-making appears to be moving further away from the 
oikos, the household, into the rarefied realms of supranational institutions, 
bureaucratic and commercial alike. Consequently, the complex of 
historically derived abstractions we have come to call “the economy” has 
appeared to move ‘closer’ to people (cf. Castells 1989: 16-17; Jessop 
2000), thoroughly infusing the most fundamental levels of human 
existence, thought and language, while at the same time appearing to 
speed rapidly away from the control of human agency, and even from that 
of national legislatures. Communication technology, free trade, and 
competition – the secular religion abbreviated in the term 
“globalisation” – have become sine qua non as the basic logical 
determinants from which all policy must proceed (McKenna and Graham 
2000). A grotesque caricature of liberal individualism appears to have 
become a totalitarian imperative, and price has become synonymous with 
value.   
Economic “growth”, or at least the impression thereof, has 
become, once again, the holy grail of policy (in distinction to, for example, 
full employment or quality of life issues). In a putatively globalised 
system, imperatives for competitively driven growth have led to any 
number of paradoxes. Various nationalisms and regionalisms, especially 
in areas such as economic “performance” and sport, are juxtaposed to 
inter- and supra-nationalist convergences in the form of bloated 
international bureaucracies and parasitic multinational corporations, most 
of them allegedly oriented towards “integrating”, harmonising, and, in 
some views, homogenising the nation-states of the world and their 
political economies (cf. Bauman 1998; Bourdieu 1998; Klein, 2001).  
At the level of the nation-state, a perverse imposture of liberal 
democracy has become the compulsory political system for inclusion in 
the most exclusive of global organisations. The compulsory liberalism 
currently being demanded – whether “neo” or otherwise – appears to be 
not in the least bit liberal, producing increasingly centralised, rigid, and 
intrusive systems of “globalised” governance and commerce. 
Unquestionably, there are more than just a few contradictions inherent in 
 a totalitarian liberalism. One glaring example is the apparent in the notion 
of “global” organisations (for example, “the international community”) 
with strictly limited membership and access. But that is merely one of the 
many confusing epiphenomena of a system built on systemic 
contradictions. How do we define our shifting relationships? What could 
we possibly define them as? How can we even identify their expression?   
Social function, institutions, and hybrid genres 
Characteristically, it seems, we turn our meanings into “things” 
whose existence derives almost entirely from the source of social 
imagination: making laws produces “the law” and “the rule of law”; 
painting, drawing, singing, and dancing become “art” or “culture”, these 
days requiring a ministry to oversee “its” progress; debating how best to 
live together becomes “politics”, “policies”, and “policy initiatives”; 
fighting becomes “war” or “sport”; being curious, inquiring, knowing, 
and inventing become “science” and “technology”; speaking, and more 
especially writing become “language”; and the products of human 
spiritual sentiment become “religions” and “gods”. We abstract from our 
meaningful activities to produce “things”. Then we give them power over 
us. “The rule of law”, “the word of God”, “the party line” all become 
seemingly exogenous normative forces—sources of values that deeply 
influence our behaviours towards each other, as do the products of “art”, 
“culture”, “science”, and so on.  
These broadest, most abstract and enduring aspects of human life 
do not change in their social function, but only in their specific form and 
content, in their realisation at a specific place and time (Firth 1954). The 
relationships within which law, art, science, politics, and so on are 
produced are, like any other, historically specific relations of production. 
Such relations typically become institutionalised (though not, by 
definition, fixed or immutable) and develop generic forms of expression 
through which to carry out their social “work”. But our most powerful 
generic forms appear to stand outside “production”, at least as we 
commonly understand it, precisely because they are our most abstract, and 
hence our most alien, social products. The appearance of immutable 
externality that powerful generic forms take on is an illusion, in many 
cases overtly “regulating” the rest of what is commonly, though perhaps 
incorrectly, called “production”. The people who produce, define, and 
endorse significant abstractions are – practically by definition – a minority 
elite. Our elites have always, at least throughout recorded history, 
operated within institutions of power. Social institutions performing the 
most powerful social functions are the source of our most revered generic 
forms. Institutions of power are the engine rooms of sacred genres.  
There are many reasons why that is the case. First of all, as I have 
noted above, the function of genres is to solicit and elicit certain 
expectations. The expectations placed upon, and generated by, institutions 
and their generic expressions are a form of ritual reproduction, which is 
mythical in content (cf. Bourdieu 1991; de Santillana and von Dechend. 
[1962] 1999). That is as much the case for the front page of a newspaper 
as it is for the (currently unstable) genre of annual reports, for religious 
 rituals, or for the latest generic expression of “heroic leadership”. The 
most powerful genres are historically the most contested forms of 
institutional expression, precisely because they are the literal expression 
of sanctified and sanctioned power:  
 
When language enters history its masters are priests and 
sorcerers. Whoever harms the symbols is, in the name of the 
supernatural powers, subject to their earthly counterparts, 
whose representatives are the chosen organs of society. 
(Horkheimer and Adorno [1947] 1998: 20) 
 
Consequently, powerful institutions and their generic forms of expression 
are also usually attributed with the status of sacred knowledge.2 The right 
to perform elaborate and significant social rituals, such as high mass, the 
development of a policy paper, or the opening of a parliamentary session, 
are the province of social sanction, of political delegation (Bourdieu 1991: 
57-65). Little wonder, then, that institutional ownership over the rites of 
(and rights to perform) sacred genres is most violently contested.   
It is an historical and self-evident fact that genres are profoundly 
affected by new media and their generic institutional forms (e.g. the 
generic form of the televised political “debate” is impossible without the 
existence of the medium itself). That is because new media open up new 
possibilities for expressing sacred and secular power; they offer new 
possibilities for generic expression by providing new configurations of 
modalities for making meaning. Just as Luther and Calvin were 
historically impossible phenomena without Gutenberg and the Papacy, 
Reagan, Clinton, and Blair are impossible without global television 
networks and their associated institutions, most especially in Hollywood. 
In the process of a new medium gaining predominance, specific 
institutions thus emerge as their “owners” or “purveyors”, and thus as the 
owners and purveyors of ritual forms of expression. Over time, new 
generic forms associated with new media and their institutions emerge, 
develop, fragment, and change. Innis has characterised these trajectories 
to some extent in the term ‘knowledge monopolies’, noting that the 
‘relation of monopolies of knowledge to organized force is evident in the 
political and military histories of civilization’ (1951: 4). This remains the 
case today, and it is a compelling a reason as any to focus on genre as a 
primary unit of analysis. 
It, for all the above reasons, an historical commonplace that when 
new media emerge, certain genres become unstable as institutions with a 
monopoly on the production of powerful meanings adapt to the meaning 
potentials of new media. New media open new possibility spaces for new 
textual configurations. That means the possibility of destabilising existing 
generic forms, which, in turn, means the possibility of certain institutions 
usurping the power formerly peculiar to other institutions. Today, certain 
of our genres have become inherently unstable, precisely because of 
generic convergences within and between antithetical institutional realms. 
This, in turn, is an expression of institutional convergences and 
divergences; it is an expression of functional convergences within and 
 between our institutions. It is also an expression of struggles over the 
rights to make meaning in certain ways and according to certain 
discoursal principles.  
Following is an example of generic instability being publicly 
acknowledged. The passage is part of an official annual address to the 
Radio and Television Correspondents Association annual dinner by 
former US President Clinton:  
 
Well, there has been some real news this week. The DNC 
[Democratic National Convention PG] announced it will hold 
the 2000 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles. But what you 
may not know is that the Los Angeles Planning Committee 
insisted on some minor changes in the convention format. For 
example, the Democratic candidate must start his acceptance 
speech by thanking the Academy, and saying what an honor it is 
just to be nominated. (Laughter.) In addition to the red-meat 
rhetoric as usual, there will be a fabulous vegetarian plate 
prepared by Wolfgang Puck. Tough questions will now be 
handled by stunt doubles. There'll be a fundraiser at Grauman's 
Chinese Theater. And, basically -- even after it's over -- in 
Hollywood, Oscars will still be bigger than the convention. 
(Clinton 1999a) 
 
Even though Clinton is being satirical here, he is actively, and actually, 
blurring the generic borders between the contemporary institutions of 
entertainment and politics by identifying and acknowledging their 
functional convergence. While power politics adapts itself to the genres of 
bad sitcom, global media corporations are adjusting themselves to the 
power being bestowed upon them by the “sanctification” of their generic 
forms. Gerald Levin, Time-Warner CEO and co-architect of the world’s 
largest media merger (with America On Line), is also clearly aware of 
shifting generic, institutional, and functional boundaries between politics 
and the media. He understands, not just the past-in-presentness of his own 
inheritance, but also the future-in-present tense of generic power that the 
inheritance will entail:  
 
Levin sees a future where major media corporations take on 
responsibilities currently administered by governments.  
“We're going to need to have these corporations redefined as 
instruments of public service because they have the resources, 
they have the reach, they have the skill base, and maybe there's a 
new generation coming up that wants to achieve meaning in that 
context and have an impact, and that may be a more efficient way 
to deal with society's problems than governments," predicted 
Levin. (Solomon 2000) 
 
One wonders which of society’s problems media corporations might be 
able to solve more efficiently than government. But that is not the point. 
The point is that generic instabilities give us a window on future social 
change, or more importantly, on institutional claims to legitimate power. 
 Nowhere is this clearer than in the vaudeville-cum-soap-opera of a 
globally entertainmentised politics on the one hand, and the 
overwhelmingly public-minded sentiments expressed by Gerald Levin on 
the other.  
An historical example of generic instability and its “past-in-present” 
expression 
 An historical example of generic instability brought about by 
institutional antagonisms and (eventual) convergences can be seen in the 
struggle between the papacy and the Aragonese kings which began in 
early thirteenth century Europe (Cawsey 1999). Without going into a 
detailed account, we can usefully refer to the struggle as being centred on 
the generic form of the sermon (forma sermonis). The genre of the sermon 
was quite well defined by the thirteenth century, with other official 
generic forms in art, science, and philosophy (institutionally and 
functionally indistinguishable at that time), such as the sonnet, dialectic 
argumentation, and canon law, also being well-established and well-
recognised expressions of “divine” knowledge (cf. Cawsey 1999: 444; 
Haskins 1922: 670; Makdisi 1974: 642-643).  
While Pope Innocent III had concerns about the copyists in Paris 
translating parts of the bible into the vernacular, a more pressing worry 
was that kings had begun using the sermon for political purposes, such as 
inciting citizens to participate in crusades, thus challenging the authority 
of the church by appropriating the institutional generic forms over which 
it claimed monopolistic right. Cawsey (1999) notes that the absence of 
detailed records of particular speeches is not as important to 
understanding the church-crown antagonisms of the time as the fact that 
the genre of forma sermonis was appropriated by a competing institution, 
and that this was the object of the antagonism while at the same time 
being its expression:  
 
That the complete text of this and other sermons was not 
recorded is perhaps less important than that other details were, 
for the words of the sermons on such occasions were just one 
aspect of a ceremony which in its entirety conveyed the message 
that kingship was not only temporal but spiritual and that the 
king himself was no ordinary layman. (Cawsey 1999: 450) 
 
In other words, the monarchs were claiming divine right. As the 
appropriation of the sermon became tradition amongst the Aragonese 
kings, the institution of parliaments (re)emerged, and ‘it seems that the 
Aragonese tradition of opening each session with a royal speech in the 
style of a sermon was introduced at the same time’ (Cawsey 1999: 451). 
In effect, the generic usurpation of the forma sermonis rang in, to a 
significant extent, the dual institutional “revolutions” that manifested 
themselves in what we now call the Reformation and the Enlightenment.3 
Today, sessions of the Australian Senate are still opened with the speaker 
reading The Lord’s Prayer and asking for divine guidance. Indeed, 
political science remains, at least in its own opinion, ‘the divine science’ 
 (Ranney 1976). Thus the closing line of US President Clinton’s public 
pronouncements was ‘God bless you’, or ‘God bless America’, apparently 
whatever the occasion.4  
Such ritualistically religious expressions, consisting mostly of an 
appeal to divine delegation and inspiration, also takes on far more 
elaborated forms in contemporary political discourse:  
 
In my faith tradition, the true prophet of God's message for 
humankind is the one who comes forth to say: I have been called, 
as we have all been called, to bring good news to the poor. To 
bring healing to the sick. To mend the broken-hearted. To speak 
out clearly on behalf of the oppressed.  
Dr. King reminded us that prophetic truth is marching on. 
He taught us that there is no such thing as partial freedom. All 
of our people must be free from economic privation, or none of 
our people will be fully free. In his last speech, delivered from 
the pulpit of Mason Temple in Memphis, Tennessee – when he 
told of his vision from the mountaintop – he reminded us of the 
urgent need to build "a greater economic base." (Gore 2000)  
 
That is the vice-President of the United States, not the Pope, compressing 
at least two millennia of heteroglossic power resources into five sentences 
and three sentence-fragments to propagate the a dogmatically Marxist 
outcome.5 Weber ([1930] 1992) would probably not be all that surprised 
at Gore’s invocation of “the calling”. It seems that the generic inculcation 
of the forma sermonis in parliamentary systems has left an 800-year-deep 
impression on western societies, whilst apparently turning itself inside-out 
in functional, logical, and relational terms.  
For example, in the following “proclamation”, Clinton uses his 
political position to incite his warlike nation to prayer, rather than to 
incite the faithful to war:   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United 
States of America, do hereby proclaim May 6 1999, as a National Day 
of Prayer. I encourage the citizens of this great Nation to pray, each in 
his or her own manner, seeking strength from God to face the problems 
of today, requesting guidance for the uncertainties of tomorrow, and 
giving thanks for the rich blessings that our country has enjoyed 
throughout its history.  (Clinton 1999b) 
 
Those ordained for power in entertainmentised, populist democracies are 
ordained by God through “the will of the people”. So, when we look 
backwards at this one instance of inter-institutional appropriation of a 
sacred generic form, we can see that the effects are expressed, not in 
fragmentation as might be expected, although this happens too, but in a 
sort of generic conflation, collapse, or ‘hybridisation’ (Fairclough 1992, 
2000) of conflicting and contradictory discourses. Such expressions are 
inseparable from the institutional and functional convergences that they 
express.  
 Seeing the future-in-present 
We can see what is being claimed for the future by seeing the 
hybridisation of genres within and between institutions of power. With 
the widespread diffusion of new media, it is no surprise to see widespread 
generic instabilities today. For instance, the annual report, once a dry legal 
requirement for corporations, has become a magazine-like piece of 
promotional material for almost any organisation larger than a darts club, 
usually offering very little in the way of financial information. Its function 
has also become far more expansive. Today, rather than being an annual 
legislative annoyance for corporate entities, the annual report has become 
functionally sine qua non for institutions wishing to display affectations 
and impostures of corporate managerialist “efficiency”, economic 
competency, and productivity in non-commercial entities, including and 
especially governments. Many government departments and, indeed, 
many national governments throughout the west, now use the genre of a 
corporate annual report to show that they are efficient, effective, 
productive, and, most of all, “professional”.6  
Public relations, propaganda, advertising, entertainment, finance, 
and politics have become almost indistinguishable in their appearance and 
function. Here is an example. It comes from the Queensland State 
Government and explains the rationale for the State’s new “logo”, which 
is apparently its new ‘corporate identity’:  
 
Creating an identity for the business of government involves 
the establishment, management and promotion of a distinct 
brand that identifies the government to a range of target 
groups including the population in general, visitors and 
investors. 
Presently the State’s Crest, created in the 1800s and amended 
in the 1970s is used to visually integrate the Queensland 
Government activities and signage. Unfortunately it does not 
adapt well to contemporary marketing applications. The Crest 
will not be discarded, but elevated for use in formal and 
ceremonial applications and to signify senior levels of 
government. 
The government is presented with an opportunity to identify 
itself across all its activities with an identity system that will 
improve recognition and save money through consistent 
branding and production of stationery, promotional material 
and livery. 
The Crest will be retained and elevated for ceremonial and 
ministerial use. The government identity system will be set out 
in a Corporate Identity Manual that establishes rules for the 
use of the new identity including the symbol, namestyle, 
colours, department and agency names, Crest and State Badge. 
(Department of the Premier and Cabinet 2000) 
 
According to the Queensland government, the business of government 
requires a distinct brand, an identity system, that will suit contemporary 
marketing applications, whatever they might be. This is clearly an 
 instance of corporate marketing discourse enthusiastically recommending 
its generic forms and functions-a pure self-valorising set of values 
focused on “the bottom line”-to the people who are the State of 
Queensland’s “target market”! The last paragraph, with its mention of the 
‘Corporate Identity Manual’, is especially significant. It is common 
practice in corporations that the logo is considered to be formally sacred. 
People who use a company’s logo incorrectly in promotional material by 
using the wrong Pantone™ colours, or even by using non-standard 
typefaces near the logo, risk severe legal sanctions.7 What is being 
proposed is the ordination of a sacred, iconic, and therefore mythical 
generic form to increase the value of the State of Queensland as a concept 
in itself. 
 To see the future-in-present in this case, we must identify which 
institutions are appropriating which others’ generic forms to create the 
instabilities (and extreme insecurities) being expressed by the legislative 
assembly of Her Majesty’s State of Queensland. In major historical 
episodes of institutional power struggles, sacred generic forms have 
generally been “democratised” (Innis 1951). That is to say, a larger and 
formerly less powerful group has appropriated the generic forms of the 
more powerful, prestigious, or universally “valid” institution (Graham and 
Hearn 2000; cf. also Marx and Engels [1844] 1972). Luther, for instance, 
set about “democratising” the bible by wresting control from the papacy 
and propagating it through a new medium, the book. The same happened 
with the Paris-trained copyists of twelfth century Europe with paper. In 
the case of the Queensland Government, it would seem at first blush that 
the more powerful institution is appropriating the generic forms of the 
weaker; that government is appropriating a less prestigious generic form 
from a set of institutions – the institutions of commerce – which might be, 
at another time in history, considered vulgar and functionally unsuitable, 
if not entirely inappropriate. That is clearly not the case today.  
The presence of such generic instabilities is not at all surprising in 
the presence of our current crop of new media, particularly because of 
their technical characteristics. That is not a technological deterministic 
statement. It merely acknowledges that our globalised system of digital 
media facilitates the convergence of modes and genres of expression. 
They also create possibilities for entirely new forms. We can listen to the 
“radio”, watch “television” and films, write letters, read annual reports, 
advertise and sell almost anything, and, in some cases, even institute legal 
proceedings via our new media networks (Declan McCullagh, personal 
correspondence, May 15 2000). But we need, of course, to go beyond 
technology and technical facts to explain many of the generic 
convergences we are seeing from an institutional perspective (Graham 
2000). 
Political power as myth: past-in-present-in-future 
As I have noted above, the practice of governance – the exercise 
of political power – is becoming ‘entertainmentised’ (Postman 1985; 
Wolf 1999), commercialised, and commodified (Fairclough 2000) to the 
point at which representatives of the entertainment industries can 
 conceive of themselves as functionally governmental. That is, in large part, 
a function of generic chaining:  
 
One aspect of texturing as work (social production) in a textual 
mode is the arrangement of genres in what we can call ‘generic 
chains’ as part of the chaining of practices, ie the regular 
sequential ordering of different genres. We find generic chains of 
the following general form in the welfare reform process:   .... 
speech <press release> - (media reports) - document <press 
release> - (media reports) - speech <press release> ... That is, a 
document such as the Green Paper on welfare reform is likely to be 
prepared for and followed up by speeches on the part of important 
ministers, but each of these (like the document itself) comes with its 
own press release … and each subsequent move in the chain is 
responsive to media reactions to earlier moves.  Practices such as 
focus groups may be inserted into such chains through research 
reports which also come with press releases attached. On occasion 
press conferences will also figure in such chains. (Fairclough 2000)  
 
A similar process of generic chaining accompanies the launch of any new 
product or brand (see, for instance, the rebranding campaign by BP-
Amoco 2000): press release ! mass mediated “teaser” campaign! 
elaborated advertisements! print, radio, and television appearances! in-
store promotions, and so on. The processes of generic chaining that occur 
in the promotion and “selling” of local, regional, national, and 
supranational policies are institutionally and generically almost identical 
to those involved in the process of selling the idea of an “environmentally 
friendly” oil company (BP-Amoco 2000), or of “selling” the legitimacy of 
mass murder. 
Contemporary institutions of governance and commerce both 
deploy the institutional genres of advertising, public relations, market 
research, media industries, and so forth. Specific future implications of 
these background convergences in the texturing of hybrid genres suited to 
public communication are unclear. However, considering that the makers 
of policy and, for example, soap or banking services deploy practically 
identical generic forms in selling the idea of their “products” to the public, 
we ought to expect some sort of widespread attitudinal and institutional 
confusion to ensue. And this appears to be the case. Our institutions of 
commerce and governance are converging and merging at an historically 
unequalled rate. Today, we have a massive supranational legislative 
system that would intimidate the most seasoned Byzantine bureaucrat. 
The WTO, IMF, OECD, UN, EU, UNESCO, APEC – the acronymic list 
of global institutions of power is seemingly endless.  
Simultaneously, we also have an even larger expansion in the 
mass of supranational corporations. These institutions, commercial and 
legislative, define each other in ways comparable to that of the church and 
monarchy during “divine right” feudalism, each legitimising the other, 
each claiming control over different aspects of human experience on a 
global scale, each dividing the realms of human experience amongst 
 themselves. But throughout feudal Europe, the church always appears to 
have had the advantage in the relationship. Religion knows only 
theological borders, whereas aristocracies are defined in boundaries of the 
most concrete geographical nature. When the institutional, functional, and 
generic forms of church and crown finally converged as a result of 
centuries of struggle, and once the religion of the afterlife was replaced by 
the religion of war and trade, the seeds of ‘hypermodern managerialism’ 
were sown (Armitage and Graham in press). The result was the literal 
secularisation of sacred power, followed closely by the excesses of the 
counter-reformation, followed by the excesses of sacred knowledge—the 
scholastic-revolutionaries of the “enlightenment” (Smith, Locke, Newton, 
Hume, Bentham, Mill) claimed for themselves the right to define the 
place of everything, and to put everything in its proper place. 
Global contradictions and their systemic expression  
In the relationship between supranational corporations and 
legislative assemblies, the religious element once again has the upper 
hand. The representatives of “global capital" are united in their simple 
theology, which is organised solely around the principles that inhere in 
money (simply power in the last analysis), a well-developed form of 
expression with (literally speaking) many generic derivatives. Money, the 
religious aspect of commerce, its divine and transcendental expression, is 
no longer bothered by geography (if it ever was). In fact a large 
percentage of the daily trillions that swirl around the globe travels by 
satellite, leaving the earth as it does its self-valorising rounds. 
Supranational legislative assemblies, though, currently remain tethered to 
the muck and tedium of geotechnically defined dirt: national assemblies, 
nation-states, and, most especially, the “democratic” rituals thereof. These 
last are the nationally-derived genres from whence supranationals draw 
their legitimacy. They appear to feel this burden of representative 
answerability acutely, and are currently working towards separating 
themselves from accountability at the level of the nation state (Graham 
1999). This antagonistic relationship between national and supranational 
legislatures expresses an important and somewhat embarrassing dynamic.  
Nations are in all-out economic competition with each other. War 
and trade have merged in the generic forms of institutional competition 
and antagonism (Armitage and Graham in press). All of this, this 
“globalising” trajectory, is presented in simultaneously articulated and 
contradictory discourses: a Darwinian struggle for survival, an expression 
of absolute freedom, as a source of absolute harmony, and as an 
expression of the fear of death (Weiss and Wodak 2000). Acts of 
international cooperation appear as accidental expressions of the need for 
“certainty” on the part of that amorphous but important group known as 
“international investors”. Being “internationally competitive” is the key 
concern of policy considerations in nations throughout the developed 
world (Weiss and Wodak in press). That makes the job of reconciling 
conflicting national concerns at the supranational level a practical 
necessity. Further, the current dynamic, should it continue, will practically 
ensure that supranational organisations are completely freed from national 
 ties, as international bureaucracies – the legislative counterpart of 
international commerce – find more and more issues that are of 
“international concern” and which cannot be dealt with at the national 
level. Presently, a “liberal trading environment”; the “free movement of 
information” (including currencies and shares); the “increasing mobility 
of labour”; the “protection of intellectual property”; and “pollution” are 
the five main thematic elements (textual constituents) that provide 
organisational coherence for this dynamic driven by supranational-
national legislative self-alienation (Miller, Michalski, and Stevens 1998).8  
The contradiction of corporate socialism: Genres and tenses of 
ownership  
At the same time as democratic alienation is in full flight, 
transnational businesses are becoming more socially-owned entities. 
Shareholder capitalism is at an all-time high in the “west”. Australia’s 
conservative, neoliberal government prides itself on being the legislative 
“representative” of the world’s largest share-owning population (per 
capita) in history. And, as shareholding individuals become 
commonplace—as the generic expression of equity ownership in the 
means of production gets “democratised”—the power of publicly-listed 
corporations grows. Inversely, the power of the largest number of 
individual shareholders diminishes as their shareholdings in these 
companies are globally dispersed. The possibility of assembling 
thousands of members dispersed throughout the world at, for instance, an 
annual meeting, becomes impossible.  
Simultaneously, national governments continue to acknowledge 
that their power is diminishing. Little falls under the purview of the truly 
neoliberal government other than the control of the means of repression 
(or protection, depending on the direction in which one is looking): 
military, police, and other security agencies. The contradictions of 
neoliberal enthusiasm for socially owned businesses ought to be fairly 
clear. Social ownership of the means of production has long been the 
dream of socialisms and communisms of all sorts, scientific and utopian 
alike. Pure neoliberalism, presumably, would not countenance such a 
situation. But neoliberal enthusiasm for social ownership of businesses is 
just another contradictory expression of a relational dynamic which has 
seemingly caught us by surprise, and for which we have very little 
analytical equipment.  
Again, we need to consider mediation, not “disintermediation”. 
Shareholders are not usually the immediate owners of a company, even 
though they are often its immediate financiers, at least in the first instance. 
Share ownership is mediated, not merely by stockbrokers, computer 
programs, or professional “advice”; it is institutionally and generically 
mediated in such forms as superannuation fund management systems. 
Thus systems of ownership also have their generic forms of expression 
(title deeds, share certificates, superannuation statements, etc). Most 
working people in developed countries own shares through large 
superannuation funds. The funds, in turn, often outsource their investment 
 decisions to other institutions—supranational investment houses and the 
like—of which there are relatively few.  
People who own shares through such structurally mediated 
arrangements are usually not even aware what they own in specific terms. 
In fact, they own nothing in a formal sense, other than a share in the 
future fortunes of their superannuation fund(s). That is always a future-
oriented space of value-possibilities. Ownership is represented in this 
system only by a quantum of money which is not specifically “owned”, 
even though it represents some part of someone’s (already-spent) life 
force. Qualitatively and practically, the mass of share owners have no 
specific ownership in capital whatsoever. Even the quantity of money that 
represents an “owner’s” share in a superannuation fund’s fortune is far 
from fixed and guaranteed in nature. These sorts of “owners” are also, by 
definition, producers.  
That means they are (at least) doubly alienated: first, from the 
product of their activity, second by their non-ownership “share” in the 
future possibilities of an abstract network of business fortunes to which 
they also sell their activity, their past, present, and future life-energies. 
We can assume that “day traders” are not so deluded. They have no 
ambitions to business ownership and labour purchases – in short, they 
have no pretensions to capitalism and the obligations and risks thereof. 
Ownership in this mode is a fairly straightforward, albeit abstract, 
relational link between the fortunes of gambling and the predictive 
capacity of the gambler in respect of social psychology.  
Here we see two extremes: workaday people “trusting” (usually 
under legislative coercion) their superannuation savings to companies 
who rely largely on other companies to invest their investors’ money in 
future possibilities of wealth. At the other extreme, we have people who 
are gambling on shifting moods, rumours, and plain luck on a second-by-
second basis. Neither of these extremes convert qualitatively into a 
general expression of ownership. Yet neoliberalism remains somehow 
superficially intact. A central tenet of liberalism is the ‘natural right’ to 
private property (Hobsbawm 1962: 286-288). If we are to take the 
widespread acceptance of liberalism’s emphasis on private property rights 
as a “fact” lying at the end of History, then the emergence and 
continuation of a vigorous global stock market trade, at least in its current 
form, appears somewhat mysterious. In essence, joint stock companies are 
‘social capital … in contrast to private capital, and its enterprises appear 
as social enterprises as opposed to private ones’ (Marx 1981: 567). They 
are qualitatively socialist in terms of ownership.  
Summarising the future-in-past-in-present: The contradictions of senile 
capital 
The more significant relationships that characterise the present are: 
1) massified, centralised, supranational organisations that apparently 
represent and “harmonise” the interests of nation states, which, in turn, 
are in a state of perpetual, out-and-out economic warfare; an equally 
massified, socially-owned whirlpool of transferring properties rights 
which take the generic form of the supranational corporation, each of 
 which is owned socially; and 3) a global media environment – a 
communication system and generator of global communities of meaning – 
which is quite exclusive in terms of access and control.  
So much for the generically mediated relations of non-ownership 
in non-production; for the reduction of politics to pure schlock; for the 
freedoms of totalitarian liberalism; for the re-emergence of a “feudal” 
dynamic at the end of History; for the anti-sociality of corporate socialism; 
for the future-in-past-in-present. Let us return to the largest and most 
generic (barely) functioning “polis” we have today: the nation-state. It is 
often said today that the nation state is an outdated “concept”. That is all 
the more peculiar when it is said by the representatives of nation-states; 
that is, by the representatives of national governments. “Globalisation” is 
the omniscient deity in the discourse of “the dying nation-state”. Its co-
trinitarian subordinates are “a liberal trading environment” and 
“information technology” (McKenna and Graham 2000). These three 
forces, we are told, over and over, are making it harder for governments to 
govern. All that is left for government, it would seem, is tax, “the rule of 
law”, and “the protection of property rights”. That is, the exercise of the 
means of expropriation and violence in the maintenance of private space.  
The current generic instabilities and contradictions in nation-state 
politics are expressed in a global panorama of nonsensical, “bread and 
circuses” power politics; a hyped-up, light-speed blur of non-sequitur 
flotsam cast off by converging and warring institutions of power, each 
growing larger, each being (ostensibly) more and more “democratic”, and 
each (all the while) fighting for the right to define the meaning of being 
human. The organisational forces that helps us “make sense” of these 
rapidly changing genres—these expectation-producing  forms of 
expression—are myth, discourse, and ritual; they are (re)presentations of 
attitudes; (re)organisations of things, people, and their relationships 
according to both ancient and contemporary logics at once; they both 
create, produce, and reproduce the impression of coherent meaning, often 
where none may be found (McKenna and Graham 2000). The fast-crazing 
blur of hybrid genres is merely the senile illusions of a system close to 
death, and sick with old age on the one hand, and enthralled with the 
possibility of experiencing what has been known since myth first 
attempted to grasp the wholeness of experience.  
Back to the future now  
A conclusion is out of place in any focus on possible futures. I 
have written the following instead. There is nothing in history to suggest 
that the human species is on an inexorable drive to perfection by way of 
progress, technical or otherwise. In fact, history suggests the opposite—
namely, that ‘each civilization has its own means of suicide’ (Innis 1951: 
141). Many knowledges, technologies, and civilisations have flourished 
and perished, leaving only hints of their genesis, development, and 
organising principles. The Darwinian perspective is also rather bleak, 
even if it is an inappropriate model by which to understand social change. 
Extinction would appear to be the rule proven by a few extant exceptions. 
 By some accounts (Graham and Hearn 2000; McMurtry 1999: 6-7), the 
west is either headed for, or is in, a new dark ages: 
 
The last dark age can be seen from a distance. We can discern 
its culture of imposed silence that brooks no criticism of the 
ruling order as a kind of collective delirium in which the mind is 
submerged as in a dream. We may see it around us again 
today – after the fall of a world empire, after the unravelling of 
civil fabrics by barbarians overrunning all resisters and looting 
what is at hand, and in the thrall of a global end-of-history 
ideology. (McMurtry 1999: 6) 
 
By other accounts, we have already passed the end of History (Fukuyama 
1995). But the advanced state of capital’s systemic logic, and the degree 
of saturation that its self-contradictory logic enjoys, simultaneously 
implies the most developed state of its contradictions. Having expressed 
its apotheosis and realising its true nature, capitalism has become 
something other than itself. It contravenes the law of self-identity, even in 
terms of self-observation, and so must be something else. But we do not 
know what that “something else” is yet, or even what it might be. 
Consequently, words fail us, and we are, by some accounts, in the midst 
of the ‘post-everything’ society (Robinson and Richardson 1999):  
 
When people face what nothing in their past has prepared them 
for they grope for words to name the unknown, even when they 
can neither define nor understand it. Some time in the third 
quarter of the century we can see this process at work among 
intellectuals of the West. The key word was the small preposition 
‘after’, generally used in its latinate form ‘post’ as a prefix to 
any of the numerous terms which had, for some generations, 
been used to mark out the mental territory of twentieth-century 
life. The world, or its relevant aspects, became post-industrial, 
post-imperial, post-modern, post-structuralist, post-Marxist, 
post-Gutenberg, or whatever. (Hobsbawm 1994: 288) 
 
Other post-isms spring easily to mind - post-Fordism, post-colonialism 
post-materialism, and so on, seemingly ad infinitum. In this intellectual 
groping for new descriptors, we can also see evidence of civilisations in 
crisis. It is not merely an “economic” or “political” crisis, it is above all a 
crisis of understanding. We have ceased to understand ourselves – if we 
ever have – as a species. In any case, I disagree with Hobsbawm’s 
assessment that we are facing “what nothing in our past has prepared us 
for”. The opposite would appear to be the case. Our past, by definition, 
and by necessity, has produced our present. We have simply lost touch 
with our own history by dint of a perverse emphasis on the future-in-
present. Our past will also be present in our future, as will our present. 
 What I have shown here is the efficacy of a textual lens focused at 
a specific level through which to see our histories—the level of genre. 
Genres that elicit and solicit specific sets of expectations are expressions 
of a lot of social work, all of which is, by definition, done within specific 
 social domains (institutions). Once they are developed, they become 
available for contestation and appropriation on the basis of their social 
effectiveness and their very recognisability. When we see genres 
hybridising, especially the genres of power, we are seeing an expression 
of institutional convergence. Genres and institutions are mutually 
constitutive. This is especially evident where institutions of power are 
concerned. With such an approach, we may well be able to see what has 
happened and what might well happen when certain institutions converge. 
That is, perhaps, the most important challenge for those of us who would 
grasp the currently transitional system, and the one which will emerge 
from the death throes of this transitional stage. 
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Notes 
1. I present here what would undoubtedly be called a “western” 
perspective. That is a function of my social situatedness. I make no 
pretensions to understanding the largest part of humanity which is not 
 generally categorised as “western” (although I find any neat distinction 
dubious to say the least). That said, I am more than mindful of the 
macro-historical heritage of what now passes for “western thought”.  
2. Knowledge is not power. Power is endowed with the assumption and 
attribution of knowledge because of its status as power, not the reverse. 
3. It is a mistake to put a punctuation point at the seventeenth century and 
call it “the enlightenment”. It merely reflects our tendency to ‘neatly 
trim the epochs of history’ (Marx, [1846] 1972). If there was such a 
revolution, it was syncretic and not punctuated (Graham and Hearn 
2000).  
4. An exhaustive list of instances is not possible here. There are far too 
many to list. As randomly chosen examples, see Clinton (1999a,b 
2000).  
5. Although my work is strongly influenced by Marx’s, I have no 
sympathy for high-structuralist, economic deterministic “Marxisms” 
that have transformed a pluralistic and flexible body of work into a 
pseudo-radical dogma which is not much different in its expression 
than totalitarian neoliberalism.  
6. While the British and Australian Governments, for instance, display 
great enthusiasm for annual reports, the US relies on its State of the 
Union Address to perform this function. That is a rather  interesting 
reflection on its oral tradition of public discourse (Postman 1985).  
7. I am an escapee from the advertising industry and this is a matter of 
long direct experience with the “corporate identity manual”.  
8. The linguistically sensitive reader will notice that I have compressed a 
massive and literally incomprehensible set of processes and people into 
a few banal sounding “things”. That is what happens in policy language 
and it is the basis of resignation. 
 
